Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher: MIT Press
Total Pages: 372
Release: 1995
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9780262011471

The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.

Repeated Games

Repeated Games
Author: Jean-François Mertens
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Total Pages: 597
Release: 2015-02-09
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 110703020X

This landmark work significantly advances the literature on game theory with a masterful conceptual presentation of the CORE working papers published in 1994.

Repeated Games and Reputations

Repeated Games and Reputations
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Total Pages: 664
Release: 2006-09-28
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 0198041217

Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.

A First Course on Zero-Sum Repeated Games

A First Course on Zero-Sum Repeated Games
Author: Sylvain Sorin
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Total Pages: 228
Release: 2002-03-07
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9783540430285

This volume aims to present the basic results in the theory of two-person zero-sum repeated games including stochastic games and repeated games with incomplete information. It is intended for graduate students with no previous knowledge of the field.

Strategies and Games, second edition

Strategies and Games, second edition
Author: Prajit K. Dutta
Publisher: MIT Press
Total Pages: 713
Release: 2022-08-09
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 0262368501

The new edition of a widely used introduction to game theory and its applications, with a focus on economics, business, and politics. This widely used introduction to game theory is rigorous but accessible, unique in its balance between the theoretical and the practical, with examples and applications following almost every theory-driven chapter. In recent years, game theory has become an important methodological tool for all fields of social sciences, biology and computer science. This second edition of Strategies and Games not only takes into account new game theoretical concepts and applications such as bargaining and matching, it also provides an array of chapters on game theory applied to the political arena. New examples, case studies, and applications relevant to a wide range of behavioral disciplines are now included. The authors map out alternate pathways through the book for instructors in economics, business, and political science. The book contains four parts: strategic form games, extensive form games, asymmetric information games, and cooperative games and matching. Theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, Condorcet paradox, backward induction, subgame perfection, repeated and dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, signaling, the Shapley value, and stable matchings. Applications and case studies include OPEC, voting, poison pills, Treasury auctions, trade agreements, pork-barrel spending, climate change, bargaining and audience costs, markets for lemons, and school choice. Each chapter includes concept checks and tallies end-of-chapter problems. An appendix offers a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, which underpins game theory.

Multiple Stopping Problems

Multiple Stopping Problems
Author: Georgy Sofronov
Publisher: CRC Press
Total Pages: 376
Release: 2024-12-24
Genre: Mathematics
ISBN: 1040228925

This book presents the theory of rational decisions involving the selection of stopping times in observed discrete-time stochastic processes, both by single and multiple decision-makers. Readers will become acquainted with the models, strategies, and applications of these models. It begins with an examination of selected models framed as stochastic optimization challenges, emphasizing the critical role of optimal stopping times in sequential statistical procedures. The authors go on to explore models featuring multiple stopping and shares on leading applications, particularly focusing on change point detection, selection problems, and the nuances of behavioral ecology. In the following chapters, an array of perspectives on model strategies is presented, elucidating their interpretation and the methodologies underpinning their genesis. Essential notations and definitions are introduced, examining general theorems about solution existence and structure, with an intricate analysis of optimal stopping predicaments and addressing crucial multilateral models. The reader is presented with the practical application of models based on multiple stopping within stochastic processes. The coverage includes a diverse array of domains, including sequential statistics, finance, economics, and the broader generalization of the best-choice problem. Additionally, it delves into numerical and asymptotic solutions, offering a comprehensive exploration of optimal stopping quandaries. The book will be of interest to researchers and practitioners in fields such as economics, finance, and engineering. It could also be used by graduate students doing a research degree in insurance, economics or business analytics or an advanced undergraduate course in mathematical sciences.

A Course in Game Theory

A Course in Game Theory
Author: Martin J. Osborne
Publisher: MIT Press
Total Pages: 374
Release: 1994-07-12
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9780262650403

A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.

Markets, Games, and Organizations

Markets, Games, and Organizations
Author: Tatsuro Ichiishi
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Total Pages: 315
Release: 2012-12-06
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 354024784X

We are pleased to help celebrate Roy Radner's 75th birthday, by issuing in one volume the papers that originally appeared in his honor in two special issues of Review of Economic Design (Vol. 6/2 and 6/3-4, 2001). Through his truly original ideas and lucid writing, Roy has influenced and guided the theory community for decades. Many colleagues and students have found their own work shaped and improved by Roy's wide-ranging curiosity, his encouragement, and his keen insights. In soliciting contributions to the Review of Economic Design Radner issues, we decided to approach his former students at the University of California, Berke ley, his former post-doctoral fellows at Bell Laboratories, and his published co authors. We express our sincere apology to any potential authors who fit these categories and whom we may have unintentionally failed to approach. Our job as editors of the Review of Economic Design Radner issues turned out to be easy, thanks to the enthusiastic response we received from authors and the quality of their submissions.