Rewarding Performance in Compensation Act

Rewarding Performance in Compensation Act
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Education and the Workforce
Publisher:
Total Pages: 22
Release: 1999
Genre: Academic achievement
ISBN:

H.R. 2710, the Rewarding Performance in Compensation Act

H.R. 2710, the Rewarding Performance in Compensation Act
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Education and the Workforce. Subcommittee on Workforce Protections
Publisher:
Total Pages: 104
Release: 1998
Genre: Law
ISBN:

Rewarding Performance in Compensation Act

Rewarding Performance in Compensation Act
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Education and the Workforce. Subcommittee on Workforce Protections
Publisher:
Total Pages: 96
Release: 2002
Genre: Electronic government information
ISBN:

Designing an Effective Pay for Performance Compensation System

Designing an Effective Pay for Performance Compensation System
Author: Cynthia H. Ferentinos
Publisher:
Total Pages: 51
Release: 2006-07
Genre:
ISBN: 9781422305881

Federal Government agencies are moving to better align pay with performance & create organizational cultures that emphasize performance rather than tenure. However, agencies must invest time, money, & effort in the design of their pay for performance compensation systems in order to succeed. To help agencies understand the critical prerequisites to success & key decision points, a review was conducted of professional & academic writings on the topic of pay for performance. This user-friendly guide summarizes the research findings. Contents: a summary of pay for performance; benefits & risks associated with pay for performance; pay for performance decision points; conclusions & recommendations; & bibliography. Illustrations.

Pay Without Performance

Pay Without Performance
Author: Lucian A. Bebchuk
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Total Pages: 308
Release: 2004
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 9780674020634

The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.